Although South Korea is not a member of NATO, the convergence of strategic interests between Seoul and the Alliance is unmistakable. South Korea is a technologically advanced democracy that shares NATO’s commitment to the rules-based international order. It faces constant military threats from North Korea and navigates an increasingly coercive regional environment shaped by China’s assertiveness. At the same time, NATO has recognized the security implications of developments in the Indo-Pacific and the global dimensions of authoritarian cooperation among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. The deepening linkage between theaters—evident in arms transfers from North Korea to Russia, drone proliferation, and cyber threats—underscores the fact that NATO security can no longer be addressed in isolation from Asia.
South Korea’s defense industry, now ranked among the world’s top exporters, is well-positioned to support NATO in meeting its urgent capability needs while also enabling the Alliance’s longer-term strategic transformation. This contribution is manifest in three critical dimensions: industrial capacity and timely delivery; technological innovation; and logistical and sustainment support.
First, South Korea offers NATO members a credible and scalable alternative to overcome defense production bottlenecks. The war in Ukraine has exposed the inadequacy of NATO’s current defense industrial base, particularly in terms of ammunition production, armored vehicle delivery, and long-range fires. European countries have been slow to ramp up production, hindered by years of underinvestment, labor shortages, and supply chain dependencies. In contrast, South Korea’s defense sector has demonstrated an ability to produce advanced weapons systems at speed and scale. The $14 billion weapons deal between South Korea and Poland, concluded in 2022, is a landmark example. It includes K2 main battle tanks, K9 self-propelled howitzers, Chunmoo rocket launchers, and FA-50 light fighter jets, all delivered under compressed timelines with training and sustainment packages.
This level of responsiveness—combined with cost efficiency and performance reliability—has made South Korean systems particularly attractive to NATO’s eastern flank countries that urgently need to backfill depleted inventories. The integration of these systems into NATO forces enhances deterrence credibility while allowing member states to conserve domestic industrial capacity for long-term rebuilding.
Second, South Korea is not just a volume supplier—it is a source of advanced defense technology with increasing potential for co-development and innovation. The country has invested heavily in high-tech defense capabilities across multiple domains: artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, precision-guided munitions, naval shipbuilding, and next-generation aircraft. Platforms such as the KFX fighter (KF-21), the CIWS-II naval close-in weapon system, and future vertical lift programs illustrate Seoul’s remarkable advancement in sophisticated defense sectors traditionally dominated by Western firms.
For NATO, which is now emphasizing technological edge as a core pillar of its future deterrence posture, South Korea represents a valuable innovation partner. South Korean firms can participate in NATO’s DIANA (Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic) initiative or co-develop advanced systems with European firms. Such collaboration would strengthen transatlantic-industry resilience and reduce NATO’s dependency on narrow, geopolitically exposed supply chains, especially in critical technology areas. Moreover, Korean industry’s export compliance, transparency, and alignment with international norms make it a more politically viable partner compared to others operating outside NATO’s values framework.
Third, South Korea can play a significant role in the logistics, maintenance, and training functions essential to sustaining NATO’s expanded operational commitments. As NATO increases its forward presence in Eastern Europe and considers new deployments along its southern and northern flanks, operational readiness will depend on effective maintenance and sustainment solutions. Korean companies possess proven MRO (maintenance, repair, and overhaul) infrastructure and global service networks, especially for platforms like the FA-50 and K9 that are now in service across multiple allied countries. These firms can help NATO establish local or regional support hubs, reducing the logistical burdens of transcontinental sustainment and ensuring platform readiness during crises.
In addition to physical support, South Korea’s training programs and doctrine development initiatives offer added value. Its experience operating under constant high-threat conditions from North Korea has driven the ROK military and defense firms to prioritize readiness, resilience, and rapid response. NATO can benefit from this operational knowledge—particularly in areas like counter-artillery systems, civil defense integration, and multi-domain training—which remains directly relevant to scenarios involving Russian or hybrid threats in Europe.
Despite the evident benefits, several challenges may temper the expansion of South Korea’s defense industrial role within NATO. The lack of formal alliance membership limits access to certain classified interoperability and procurement channels. Political concerns in Europe about reliance on non-NATO suppliers may persist, especially where strategic autonomy and industrial protectionism intersect. Furthermore, Seoul must navigate its growing global defense role with sensitivity to China’s geopolitical perceptions, as well as maintain domestic consensus about extending its strategic footprint beyond the Korean Peninsula.
However, these obstacles can be addressed through carefully structured engagement. South Korea and NATO could establish a dedicated Defense Industry Cooperation Dialogue under the existing NATO–ROK partnership framework, focused on standardization, procurement coordination, and joint research. South Korean defense firms could be invited to participate in NATO capability planning processes in observer or partner roles, particularly in the areas where their systems are already deployed by member states. Training exchanges, officer secondments, and participation in NATO Centers of Excellence—such as in cyber defense, logistics, or defense innovation—would help institutionalize interoperability and long-term trust.
South Korea could also pursue bilateral defense industrial agreements with key NATO members—such as Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States—within a trilateral or mini-lateral framework that supports NATO’s broader strategic objectives. These arrangements would not only deepen practical cooperation, but also create a model for integrating capable non-member states into NATO’s evolving security ecosystem.
The strategic logic is clear. NATO’s security can no longer be maintained solely by internal coordination and legacy defense production models. As it adapts to a new era of persistent competition and hybrid conflict, it must draw on capable, aligned partners with advanced industrial ecosystems. South Korea offers precisely this: a mature, innovative, and dependable defense industry that can deliver real capability across domains and timelines. Its involvement strengthens NATO’s credibility, enhances its readiness, and supports its goal of collective deterrence in a more unpredictable world.
In this way, South Korea’s defense industry is not simply a supplier of weapons. It is a strategic enabler—one that brings production capacity, technological innovation, and operational reliability to the security architecture of NATO. As transatlantic defense demands global partnerships, the ROK’s defense industrial role will be increasingly indispensable. The challenge ahead is not whether to work with South Korea, but how to institutionalize and optimize this cooperation to meet the shared challenges of the 21st century.
About the author:
Jihoon Yu is the Director of External Cooperation and an associate research fellow at the state-run Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA).
Jihoon was the member of Task Force for South Korea’s light aircraft carrier project and KSS-III submarine project. His area of expertise includes the ROK-US alliance, the ROK-Europe security cooperation, inter-Korean relations, national security, maritime security, maritime strategy, and strategic weapons systems.
Jihoon earned his B.A. in International Relations from the ROK Naval Academy, M.A. in National Security Affairs from the US Naval Postgraduate School, and Ph.D. in Political Science from Syracuse University.
