However, Europe’s ability to support Ukraine militarily remains constrained, while Russia’s production capacity is surging. Europeans need to redouble their efforts if they want to affect the outcome of the war. The EU’s policies in the defence industrial field will have a tangible impact on whether Europeans can increase their support to Ukraine and reinforce their own ability to deter aggression.
This policy brief takes stock of the EU’s involvement in defence matters. While the EU has made substantial progress, its initiatives have a mixed record. Most EU defence instruments are small, and they are not very embedded in national defence planning. More broadly, the Union’s involvement in defence is primarily aimed at strengthening Europe’s defence industry over the long-term, rather than quickly reinforcing military capabilities.
The EU needs to focus more attention and resources on short-term priorities, fostering more joint procurement of already existing equipment and helping expand production capacity of critical defence materiel such as ground-based air defence interceptors and long-range missiles. EU investments in research and development will not have a tangible impact on the war in Ukraine, but they can play an important role in the long-term.
Finding more money for EU defence will be difficult. There is little spare capacity in the EU budget and many member-states remain sceptical of joint borrowing. Off-budget funding could be an option, and finding ways to make existing funds go further will be essential. Cohesion funds and money from the post-COVID Recovery and Resilience Facility could be used to help expand production capacity for military capabilities. Encouraging more lending to the defence sector should also be a priority for EU leaders.
If Europeans fail to build up their defence capacity, their ability to continue to support Ukraine will be constrained. Russia could gradually gain the upper hand in the conflict, especially if US support diminishes over the coming year. An emboldened Russia may then be tempted to test NATO’s defences – particularly if Donald Trump is re-elected and casts doubt on America’s willingness to defend allies, or if the US has to divert military assets to deal with a conflict in Asia.
Full policy brief: Centre for European Reform (CER).
