According to an article on the website of the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), the RDK claims to be in possession of almost complete documentation of the Russian missile program, including technical tasks, designs, schematics, and minutes of meetings.
According to the chief of staff of RDK, in an interview with a Ukrainian channel, the intel was acquired from Russian engineers themselves, who collaborated for money. RDK operates on Russian territory. It states that among its goals is the collapse of Putin’s regime.
On May 1, 2024, the RDK’s Chief of Staff, Alexander (a.k.a. “Fortuna”), gave an interview to Ukrainian 5 Kanal news outlet. The interview covered a variety of topics but focused mainly on intelligence acquired by the unit of a Russian missile program. During the course of hostilities in Ukraine, the corps expanded its activities. Alexander noted that the corps is not merely a combat unit but also engages in political activity and, as the interviewee put it, “OSINT,” or open-source intelligence, including Russia’s missile, electronic warfare, and submarine programs, as well as investigations of war crimes and missing persons’ searches.
According to the article on the MEMRI website, the main object of the RDK’s intel-gathering operations currently seems to be the Russian state-owned “Almaz-Antey” corporation.
The company manages several important arms industry plants, engages in the manufacturing of air defence systems, surface-to-surface missiles, surveillance, and radar equipment. Alexander stated that about a year and a half ago, the corps acquired documentation on a Russian missile program, and based on that information, the RDK was able to identify Russian engineers engaged in missile manufacturing.
“Some of these engineers began to cooperate with us, some refused, and some we were able to ‘hack,’ so to speak, i.e., we were able to penetrate [Russian] plant’s security system,” claims Alexander. In this regard, the RDK’s chief of staff mentioned the “Novator Design Bureau,” where the group was able to access insider correspondence. In addition to technical documentation, RDK managed to acquire private info on the engineers working at the plant. “I have information about what gifts the children of engineers received for last New Year… where they go [on vacation], where they live…” boasted the interviewee.
Alexander notes that many engineers they have contacted are willing to cooperate with the corps, provided they are handsomely paid. The RDK’s chief of staff notes that the majority of Russian engineers receive a poor salary, and some are eager to regularly sell intel when the corps offers them a monthly payment of about $1,000 – $1,500. Alexander claims that there are dozens of such collaborating engineers, working at various plants in the Russian missile program. He contends that Moscow fails to protect the personal information of the engineers; the engineers often become the target of the state’s prosecutors.
The interview argues that Russia’s potential to manufacture missiles has been severely limited by Western sanctions. For instance, despite interesting projects in the field of R&D, their realization lacks infrastructure and components; projects face financial troubles. Thus, they are focusing on the modernization of equipment already in service. As an example, “Fortuna” recalls recent uses of the “FAB”-family of heavy aviation bombs. These bombs, designed back in the days of the Soviet Union, are being equipped with airborne planning modules. “Now, they [the Kremlin] are simply trying to use old stocks [of arms] effectively,” he concludes.
