U.S. Navy’s Trump-class nuclear battleship plan draws questions over cost and shipyard capacity

By Martin Chomsky (Defence Industry Europe)

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U.S. Navy’s Trump-class nuclear battleship plan draws questions over cost and shipyard capacity

Image: U.S. Navy.

The U.S. Navy has formally included a new class of nuclear-powered guided-missile battleships, known as the Trump-class BBG(X), in its fiscal 2027 shipbuilding plan. The programme would mark the first planned U.S. nuclear-powered surface combatants in about three decades and is intended to provide long-range strike, missile defence, command-and-control and sustained combat capability in contested regions, particularly the Indo-Pacific.

The plan effectively absorbs many technologies and capabilities previously associated with the DDG(X) next-generation destroyer programme, which had been viewed as the successor to the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. However, programme details remain conceptual, with no detailed ship design yet completed and many technical parameters still subject to change.

The Navy describes the Trump-class as a separate category of “high-end surface combatant” designed to concentrate combat power in a small number of large, heavily armed ships. The shift represents a move away from relying mainly on numerous multi-mission destroyers and towards platforms with greater weapons capacity, power generation and future upgrade margins.

The Navy plans to acquire 15 nuclear-powered battleships by fiscal 2055. The first ship, currently referred to as BBG(X)-1 and preliminarily named USS Defiant, is expected to be contracted in fiscal 2028 and enter service in fiscal 2036, depending on programme execution and shipbuilding schedules.

 

 

The estimated unit cost of the first Trump-class ship is $17.47 billion, while the average cost of the first three ships is estimated at $14.5 billion each. The first three vessels would cost about $43.5 billion, equal to around 16.2% of the Navy’s projected five-year shipbuilding budget of $268 billion for fiscal 2027 through fiscal 2031.

Independent estimates cited in the material suggest the first ship could cost between $17.6 billion and $18.9 billion if its displacement reaches about 35,000 tonnes. By comparison, the first three Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers cost $13.3 billion, $13.2 billion and $14.2 billion, respectively, while the three Zumwalt-class destroyers being converted to carry hypersonic missiles cost about $7.5 billion to $8 billion each.

The official acquisition cost for all 15 ships is estimated at $217.6 billion in fiscal 2027 dollars. However, life-cycle costs over 40 to 50 years of service could reach $500 billion to $700 billion when cost growth, operations, modernisation, infrastructure and training are included, according to the analysis cited in the input material.

Conceptual characteristics include a displacement of more than 35,000 tonnes, making the ship about three times larger than an Arleigh Burke Flight III destroyer and more than twice the size of a Zumwalt-class destroyer. The ship’s length is estimated at 256 to 268 metres, although beam, draught and final hull dimensions have not been publicly defined.

Planned equipment could include a 12-cell Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missile system, 128 Mk 41 vertical launch cells, sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles, a 32-megajoule railgun, high-power lasers, two 127 mm guns, electronic warfare systems and large radar arrays. Some of these capabilities, including the railgun, lasers and nuclear cruise missiles, remain potential additions rather than confirmed elements of the final baseline design.

 

 

The decision to pursue a nuclear-powered surface combatant reflects the Navy’s assessment that only a reactor can provide enough sustained electrical power for future weapons and sensors. The choice also marks a break from earlier expectations that a future large surface combatant could use hybrid propulsion based on gas turbines, diesel generators and electric motors.

The nuclear propulsion decision brings major industrial implications. Newport News Shipbuilding is currently the only U.S. shipyard with certification and experience in building nuclear-powered surface ships, but it is already heavily involved in Ford-class aircraft carriers, Columbia-class submarines, Virginia-class submarines and AUKUS-related commitments.

Other yards, including Bath Iron Works and Ingalls Shipbuilding, have experience building U.S. cruisers and destroyers but do not currently have the infrastructure or workforce required for nuclear-powered surface ship construction. Expanding such capacity would require major investment and years of preparation.

The programme has raised questions because the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base is already struggling with delays across several naval programmes. The material argues that the Trump-class plan would rely on the same industrial base that is already under pressure from existing carrier, submarine and surface combatant commitments.

The broader shipbuilding plan also calls for expanding the U.S. Navy from 395 vessels in fiscal 2027 to 450 by fiscal 2031. That total would include 299 combat ships, 68 auxiliary vessels and 83 unmanned systems, marking a significant formal integration of autonomous platforms into the Navy’s long-term force structure.

The plan follows a “high-low mix” approach, combining high-end platforms such as carriers, nuclear submarines, Arleigh Burke destroyers and Trump-class battleships with frigates, amphibious ships and growing numbers of unmanned surface and underwater systems. The Navy’s plan includes $305 billion in spending on combat ships from fiscal 2027 to fiscal 2031, including $62 billion for five Columbia-class submarines and $63 billion for 10 Virginia-class submarines.

 

 

The battleship programme has also faced doubts inside and around the Navy. Former Navy Secretary John Phelan publicly questioned assumptions on nuclear propulsion, cost and schedule, while Adm. Daryl Caudle had earlier expressed concern that nuclear propulsion could push the programme into a timeline misaligned with operational needs.

The central issue remains whether concentrating combat power in a small number of highly expensive platforms is an effective response to China’s anti-access strategy, which relies heavily on ballistic and hypersonic anti-ship missiles. The next two to three years are expected to determine whether the concept can move from planning documents to a first ship contract under real budgetary and industrial conditions.