The report says official U.S. government sources indicate that the Chinese government has ended direct involvement in transferring nuclear- and missile-related items. However, it says China-based companies and individuals continue to export goods relevant to such items, particularly to Iran and North Korea.
The report also says U.S. officials have raised concerns about entities operating in China that support proliferation-sensitive activities in other ways. These include illicit finance and money laundering.
According to a declassified January 1998 State Department report to Congress, China did not oppose new states acquiring nuclear weapons in the 1960s and 1970s. A 1983 National Intelligence Estimate said China had exported “nuclear materials since 1981” that were not subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
The estimate said Beijing did so “mainly to earn hard currency”. It said Chinese officials had realised in 1979 that they lacked sufficient resources for their modernisation programme and needed more revenue through expanded foreign trade.
The estimate said the State Council directed subordinate ministries in late 1979 to begin selling surpluses. As a result, Beijing ended its “abstention from commercial trade in conventional arms and nuclear materials”.
During the 1980s and 1990s, China transferred nuclear and missile technology to other countries’ weapons programmes, according to the report. It assisted Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran, and exported missiles to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran.
U.S. government reports and official statements say China significantly reduced nuclear- and missile-related transfers in the 1990s. Beijing also committed to improving government export controls, including pledges and policy changes noted in the 1998 State Department report.
The United States has extensive civil nuclear cooperation with China under an agreement renewed in 2015. President Bill Clinton told Congress in January 1998 that China had “made substantial strides in joining the international nonproliferation regime, and in putting in place a comprehensive system of nuclear-related, nationwide export controls” since the 1985 agreement.
China acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1992 as a nuclear-weapon state. The treaty says such a state must not transfer nuclear weapons to “any recipient whatsoever” or “in any way … assist, encourage, or induce any” nonnuclear-weapon state “to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons”.
China also participates in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which controls nuclear-related exports. It is not a partner in the Missile Technology Control Regime, but has agreed to follow the regime’s export guidelines.
Chinese officials have continued to express support for multilateral arms control and nonproliferation. Fu Cong, Director General of the Department of Arms Control at China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said in December 2020 that “China is ready to enhance non-proliferation policy exchanges and cooperation with all countries.”
China’s Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs Shen Jian said in August 2023 that China would cooperate to “preserve and strengthen existing multilateral arms control, disarmament and Non-Proliferation institutions.” A Chinese white paper published in November 2025 said there was “an urgent need to reinvigorate multilateral arms control.”
The CRS report says official U.S. government reports indicate that China has stopped direct involvement in nuclear-related proliferation and transfers of complete missile systems. It also says Chinese entities have continued proliferation-related activity and that Washington has repeatedly cited weaknesses in China’s export control system.
A 2019 State Department compliance report said “Chinese entities” continued in 2018 “to supply MTCR-controlled items to missile programs of proliferation concern, including those in Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Pakistan.” The 2023 version said the United States had “raised a number of cases” with Beijing concerning missile-related transfers “to programs of concern”.
That report said most of the cases remained unresolved despite U.S. requests for China to “investigate and put a stop to such activities”. The 2024 and 2025 editions of the same report did not address Chinese missile-related transfers.
Separate State Department reports for 2024 and 2025 said Chinese “firms and individuals” in 2023 and 2024 “worked to supply technology and equipment that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their missile delivery systems to programs of concern”. Those programmes included ones in North Korea, Iran and Pakistan.
Another State Department report said in April 2026 that “entities in China” were Iran’s primary source for “a range of equipment, goods, and technology” used in Tehran’s ballistic missile programme. The CRS report lists several U.S. sanctions imposed on China-based entities and individuals for proliferation-related activity in recent years.
These measures included Treasury sanctions on May 14, 2025, against four Chinese individuals and six China-based entities linked to efforts to help Iran domestically source critical materials for its ballistic missile programme. Treasury also sanctioned five China-based entities on April 29, 2025, for “their role in a network procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.”
The Commerce Department added a China-based company to the Entity List on March 28, 2025, for “contributions to Pakistan’s unsafeguarded nuclear activities”. The State Department also sanctioned China-based entities in 2024 and 2025 over procurement or supply of missile-related items for Iran and Pakistan.
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Vann Van Diepen told Politico in 2017 that even if such transfers are not directly state-sponsored, “China hasn’t devoted the priority, effort, or resources to thwart” them. He added that “when that continues to be the case over 20 years … over time it becomes a choice.”
The report also notes concerns that China is helping Saudi Arabia construct facilities for possible uranium production, according to press reports. Then-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale declined to provide information on the issue at a September 2020 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, citing classification concerns.
U.S. officials have also cited concerns involving money laundering, illicit financial services and illegitimate procurement by China-based entities. A 2018 Treasury report said “Chinese entities and individuals” had engaged in proliferation financing activities “for the benefit of” Iranian and North Korean WMD programmes.
Treasury said in June 2023 that North Korea “continues to utilize a network of representatives” in China and other countries to obtain “restricted components necessary to conduct research and development” for its WMD programmes. In July 2024, Treasury sanctioned a network of China-based individuals and entities “involved in the procurement of items supporting” North Korea’s ballistic missile and space programmes.
China’s construction of five civil nuclear reactors at Pakistan’s Chashma Nuclear Power Generating Station has also raised congressional concern. The CRS report says Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines prohibit such projects in a state, such as Pakistan, that lacks IAEA safeguards on all nuclear facilities.
The United States argues that only the first two Chinese reactor projects are consistent with Beijing’s Nuclear Suppliers Group commitments. China and Pakistan concluded contracts for those reactors before China joined the group in 2004.
Source: Congressional Research Service.
